patch nodes
After compromising one node, taint other nodes NoSchedule/NoExecute to force sensitive pods onto the compromised node, then steal their service account tokens or intercept their traffic.
Note:
CVE-2025-5187 (fixed in 1.33.4) was a NodeRestriction bypass, which constrains only system:nodes identities holding a kubelet certificate.
It never gated an RBAC patch grant to an ordinary ServiceAccount, so that grant is not covered by the fix and taint manipulation still works on current releases.
- API Group
- (core)
- Scope
- cluster
- Audit Level
- RequestResponse
Escalation Paths
After compromising one node, patch other nodes with NoSchedule/NoExecute taints
Sensitive pods are forced to reschedule onto the compromised node
Stealing their tokens or intercepting traffic is a separate step needing its own access on the compromised node (secrets read, exec, or hostNetwork).
Tainting only performs the steering
Additional rights needed:
Note:
CVE-2025-5187 (fixed 1.33.4) was a NodeRestriction bypass and applies only to a compromised kubelet identity, not to an RBAC patch grant.
Confirmed still working on 1.36.1 with patch on nodes alone, so treat this path as unpatched.